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I. ABSTRACT
The effects of global climate change is forecasted to cause millions of 
people to leave their homes and home countries over the next century.1 
Until this point, the current legal framework for determining the fate and
protection of people fleeing their homes due to emergency was rooted
in the United Nations (“UN”) Refugee Convention of 1951 and has been
read to exclude those whose primary reason for migration is the effects or
threat of climate change. However, the UN Human Rights Committee’s
(HRC) January 2020 decision regarding Ioane Teitiota’s deportation to his
* © 2021 Lucia Rose.  J.D. Candidate 2022, University of San Diego School
of Law. 
1. Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a
Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 349 (2009). 
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home nation of the Republic of Kiribati suggests the current framework is
amenable to expansion to address this impending global crisis.
The Teitiota decision indicates that there are two possible legal pathways 
through which climate migrants may find legal standing and protection: 
(1) an expanded reading of the definition of “refugee” under the 1951
Convention, and (2) an application of article 6 of the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights protections to climate migrants. This paper 
will examine the suggestions offered by the HRC in Teitiota and their potential
requirements, revealing the remaining legal questions and outlining a series
of scenarios that will need to be addressed for either pathway to become 
a viable strategy for migrants. 
Teitiota offered two pathways to establishing refugee status under the 
HRC definition. Neither pathway is well-defined, though both provide a 
useful framework for future claims. First, the HRC suggested five benchmarks 
by which a person displaced due to climate change or its effects might 
qualify as a “refugee” under the 1951 Convention. Teitiota offers exclusions
from which to build. Second, Teitiota also detailed three requirements of
article 6 to be met in order for an author (a claimant in UN proceedings)
must meet to successfully make a “right to life” violation claim. The
Tribunal did not, however, define quantitative standards to evaluate
governmental violations of a resident’s “right to life” stemming from 
climate change. Accordingly, although Teitiota offers a useful starting
point, the Tribunal will likely need to decide a variety of “stepping-stone” 
cases to clarify the framework set forth in Teitiota. 
II. THE CRISIS OF CLIMATE MIGRANTS AND EXISTING FRAMEWORK
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugees (hereinafter
“1951 Convention”) declared that the term “refugee” shall apply to any 
person who:
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.2 
2. G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, at 14 (Dec. 2010). 
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One hundred and forty-five state parties signed and ratified the 
Convention.3 The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
(hereinafter “1967 Protocol”) amended the definition of refugee to remove 
certain temporal and geographical limits of the definition, leaving four 
elements required to qualify as a refugee: (1) the refugee must have fled 
his/her country; (2) the refugee must be unable or unwilling to return 
home; (3) the refugee’s inability or unwillingness to return must be due to 
a fear of persecution; and (4) the persecution must be related to the 
refugee’s status in a particular group.4 The 1951 Convention was drafted 
in the aftermath of World War II in response to civil and political rights 
violations. Given this context, most experts have expressed doubt that 
“environmental refugees” would fall within the scope of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. This conclusion is particularly 
underscored by the fourth requirement that the persecution be related to 
one’s status in a particular group, a factor rarely in play among those 
seeking refugee status as a result of environmental displacement.5 In
contrast to those traditionally understood as “refugees,” climate migrants 
are often able to rely on their own home countries for prevention and 
protection measures against the effects of climate change, in a way that 
migrants escaping persecution (often from their home state) cannot.6 
Nevertheless, the potential for climate change to create a new class of
refugees, whose status would not necessarily be defined by membership 
in a particular group, has been recognized for decades. As early as 1990, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change acknowledged that the 
“gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration as 
millions are uprooted by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, and agricultural 
disruption.”7 The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has more recently noted that climate change could “affect 
hundreds of millions of people in numerous ways, including through 
‘permanent displacement.’”8 The Office of the High Commissioner went 
on to illustrate that: “The melting or collapse of ice sheets alone threatens 
3. Docherty & Giannini,  note 1, at 362; Oshani Amaratunga, Climate Displaced 
Peoples: Utilizing Regional Approaches to Combat Climate-Induced Displacement in the 
21st Century, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 273–74 (2019). 
4. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 1, at 362; Amaratunga, supra note 3, at 272– 
73. 
5.  Docherty & Giannini, supra note 1, at 362. 
6. Id. at 358. 
7. Id. at 352. 
8. Id.
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the homes of 1 in every 20 people.”9 In 2008, a UN Human Development 
report called climate change the “defining development issue of our 
generation.” Likewise, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights 
stated: “By 2050, hundreds of millions more people may become 
permanently displaced due to rising sea levels, floods, droughts, famine, 
and hurricanes.”10 
Human influence on the climate system is increasingly clear; climate
change has influenced natural and human systems across every continent 
and every ocean in recent decades.11 Figure 1 below displays the wide-
spread and diverse impacts climate change has already inflicted on every 
continent; ranging from effects on physical climate systems to biological 
systems to human and managed systems.12 
FIGURE 113 
9. Id.
 10. Julia Toscano, Climate Change Displacement and Forced Migration: An
International Crisis, 6 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 457, 460 (2015) and; Docherty & Giannini, 
supra note 1, at 349, 352. 
11. Christopher B. Field, et al., Climate Change 2014, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 12 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC]. 
12. Id. at 7.
 13. Id.
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In sum, climate change is predicted to “cause tens, potentially hundreds,
of millions of people to leave their over the coming century.14 An average
of 21.7 million people are displaced by weather-related incidents every 
year.15 There is no clear global dataset on displacement by slow on-set 
events, like sea level rise, but models are based on combined projections 
derived from factors such as population growth and submerging coastal 
zones.16 Utilizing these models, it is estimated that the number of climate 
migrants may eclipse the number of traditionally defined refugees by 2050.17 
Migration will not be evenly distributed across the globe; large-scale
migration will mainly be from the global south and developing regions.18 
Climate change migration will affect certain “hotspots” in particular: small 
island states, coastal zones, and specific regions of Africa and Asia.19 Some 
migration may be temporary, as individuals fleeing from severe weather 
events may be able to return at the conclusion of an event, but others will be 
permanent, when a part or all of a state becomes uninhabitable.20 While 
adaptation, expertise, and experience are growing across the globe in both 
the public and private sector, adaptation measures may come too late for 
some island nations who are already facing inevitable total ocean submersion.21 
The UN has highlighted sea level rise, water availability, and extreme
weather events as three primary drivers that affect climate migration.22 
However, climate-related hazards often increase the severity of other stressors,
leading to “negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for those 
living in poverty.”23 Various studies have found that the “negative impacts 
14. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 1, at 349. 
15. Beyond Borders, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION 14 (2017). 
16. Id.
17. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 1, at 349. 
18. Lauren Nishimura, ‘Climate Change Migrants’: Impediments to a Protection 
Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation 
Strategies, 27 INT. J. REFUGEE LAW, 107, 112 (2015). But see Abraham Lustgarten, How 
Migration Will Reshape America: Millions will be displaced. Where will they go?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/15/magazine/
climate-crisis-migration-america.html for the recent projections of significant domestic
migration in the USA [https://perma.cc/D56M-2TEJ].
19. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 1, at 355. 
20. Id.
 21. IPCC, supra note 11, at 8. See also Rana Balesh, Submerging Islands: Tuvalu
and Kiribati as case studies illustrating the need for a climate refugee treaty, 5 ENV. & 
EARTH LAW J. 78, 78 (2015). 
22. Jane Steffens, Climate Change Refugees in the Time of Sinking Islands, 62
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 727, 731 (2019); see also IPCC, supra note 11, at 6. 
 23. Id.
 45






















of climate change on crop yields across a wide range of regions are more 
common than any positive impacts of climate change on agriculture.”24 
While existing conflict increases vulnerability to climate change effects, 
climate change in turn increases the risk of violence.25 Civil war and 
inter-group violence can be heightened by climate change through intensifying 
existing drivers of violence like poverty and “economic shocks.”26 
Historically, climate migrants have been excluded from the 1951
Convention definition of “refugee,” primarily because of their inability to 
show a fear of persecution due to membership in a particular group.
Climate migrants have similarly been excluded from successful “right to 
life” violation claims under article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights because they are unable to show an act or omission
on behalf of the State party failing to protect the basic life of its citizens. 
Moreover, not all climate migrants will qualify as climate refugees.27 
Migrants are all persons who move from one location to another for any 
range of reasons. Within this group, some migrants will remain within 
their own countries and are characterized legally as internally displaced 
persons. Crossing an international border and seeking residence in another 
country qualifies one as an immigrant. On the contrary, merely moving 
across a border is insufficient to qualify as a refugee under international 
law, which as set forth above requires a far more rigorous showing of 
displacement factors.28 
However, as the issue of climate migration begins to intensify across 
the international community, the case of Ione Teitiota, while ultimately denied, 
indicates that there is now a potential for future climate migrants to be 
granted “refugee” protections under the 1951 Convention and/or article 6.
III. THE TEITIOTA CASE
The Teitiota family, originally from the Republic of Kiribati, a Pacific 
Island nation south of Hawaii, relocated to New Zealand in 2007.29 
Kiribati is projected to be completely submerged by water by 2050 as a 
24. IPCC, supra note 11, at 4. 
 25.  Id. at 8, 20. 
26. Id. at 20.
 27. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES (UNCHR), UNHCR viewpoint ‘Refugee’ or ‘migrant’ – Which is right? (July
11, 2016), https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-
migrant-right.html [https://perma.cc/3NFF-TLXF].
28. There are also remaining questions about the standards of admittance under a 
“climate refugee” definition, for example: is there a certain socioeconomic threshold 
required? These remaining questions will need to be clarified by the international legal 
community as this issue continues to escalate.
29. Amaratunga, supra note 3, at 267. 
46
ROSE_12 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021 9:15 AM     
  



























[VOL. 12:  41, 2021] The World After Teitiota
SAN DIEGO  JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
result of rising sea levels.30 The Teitiota family resided in New Zealand 
until 2010 when their visas expired. They applied for refugee status based 
on “changes to their environment in Kiribati caused by sea-level-rise 
31associated with climate change.”  After several lower courts’ dismissals, 
the Teitiota family’s case came in front of the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand in 2015.32 The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions
and denied the Teitiota family refugee status, holding their claim was 
“inconsistent with the definition of ‘refugee’ within existing refugee 
law.”33 The Court mandated the family to return to Kiribati.34 
In June of 2013, the Immigration and Protection Tribunal of New Zealand 
first heard Ioane Teitiota’s claims as an individual claimant.35 Teitiota
testified that beginning in the late 1990s, “life progressively became more  
insecure on Tarawa [the island he resided on] because of sea level rise.”36 
Tarawa became overcrowded due to the influx of residents from other 
islands, increasing tensions between villages.37 Simultaneously, significant 
coastal erosion affected transportation routes, salinized water supplies, 
and stripped the land of vegetation.38 Teitiota reported that his family 
relied primarily on subsistence fishing and agriculture.39 He and his wife
left for New Zealand in hopes of a better life for their future children, as 
they “had received information from news sources that there would be no 
future for life in their country.”40 Teitiota “believed that the country’s
Government was powerless to stop the sea level rise,” and “internal relocation 
was not possible.”41 
In the decision of Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, the Tribunal examined
the 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action, which provided that 
“the great majority of the population [of Kiribati] w[as] heavily dependent 
30. Id. at 266. 
31. Id. at 268. 
32. Id.
 33. Id. at 268. 
34. Sophie Lewis, Millions of future climate refugees may need protection, U.N. 
committee warns in ruling, CBS NEWS (Jan. 21, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://www.cbsnews.
com/news/climate-change-refugees-united-nations-rules/ [https://perma.cc/PE6K-XYXW].
35. Human Rights Comm., Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, Comm. No. 2728/2016, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, P 2 (Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Teitiota].





 41. Id. at 2. 
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on environmental resources.”42 The Programme of Action detailed a range
of issues deriving from the existing and projected effects of climate change, 
including coastal erosion that impacts housing, land, and property.43 
Kiribati’s government took steps to adapt to the effects of climate change,
such as diversifying crop production, but by the time of Teitiota’s filing,
half of South Tarawa’s population had “generally deteriorated” reflecting 
grave food insecurity.44 
The Tribunal also heard the testimony of John Corcoran, a doctoral 
candidate from the University of Waikato in New Zealand.45 Mr. Corcoran
testified that social tensions had heightened, and even violent fights broke 
out in Tarawa and other islands of Kiribati due to the scarcity of land.
Additionally, rapid population growth and urbanization had compromised 
the fresh water supply, waste contamination had contributed to the pollution 
of freshwater, and the increase of intense storms had led to submerged, 
uninhabitable land.46 About 60% of South Tarawa obtained fresh water 
entirely from the public utilities board.47 
The Tribunal concluded that Teitiota (1) did not fall under the definition 
of “refugee” pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and (2) had not
established a sufficient claim to a “right to life” violation under article 6
of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. First, Teitiota did not
“objectively face a real risk of being persecuted if he returned to Kiribati.”48 
Teitiota had not been subject to any land dispute—nor did a future land
dispute seem apparent.49 Additionally, there was insufficient evidence to 
show Teitiota faced a “real chance of suffering serious physical harm from 
violence,” nor that he would be unable to find land accommodations to 
grow food and obtain potable water for his family.50 Furthermore, there
was no evidence that the environmental conditions in Tarawa were “so 
perilous that [Teitiota’s] life would be jeopardized.”51 Together, these
factors excluded Teitiota from the protections proffered to a “refugee” as 
defined by the 1951 Convention.52 
Second, in response to the article 6 claim, the Tribunal underscored that 











52.  G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI) 2010, at 14. 
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right by taking programmatic steps to provide for the basic necessities for 
life.”53 Here, according to the Tribunal, Teitiota failed to point to an act 
or omission by the Government of Kiribati that “might indicate a risk that 
he would be arbitrarily deprived of his right to life.”54 This was because
the Government of Kiribati was active on the international stage in regards 
to climate change, which was evident in the 2007 Programme of Action.55 
Finally, Teitiota failed to establish that there was a “sufficient degree of 
risk to his life, or that of his family, at the relevant time.”56 This “imminent” 
temporal requirement was not fulfilled by a general risk of climate change 
effects at an unspecified future date.57 
Ioane Teitiota filed communication No. 2728/2016 with the Human 
Rights Committee against New Zealand in September of 2015.58 The 
Committee released its decision in January 2020.59 Teitiota argued that, 
by removing him to Kiribati, New Zealand violated his “right to life” under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.60 He claimed sea
level rise in Kiribati resulted in: (1) a scarcity of habitable space, causing 
violent land disputes endangering his life, and (2) environmental degradation, 
including saltwater contamination of freshwater supply.61 Teitiota argued 
that the “effects of climate change and sea level rise forced him to migrate” 
to New Zealand and that the situation on the island of Tarawa in the 
Republic of Kiribati “ha[d] become increasingly unstable and precarious 
due to sea level rise caused by global warming.”62 Teitiota claimed Kiribati 
had become “an untenable and violent environment.”63 The Committee 
analyzed Teitiota’s claim utilizing the definition of “refugee” in the 1951 
Convention as well as the article 6 “right to life” guarantee, and, like the 
Tribunal, denied Teitiota’s claim.64 However, the Committee differed 
from the Tribunal65 by suggesting that both the 1952 Convention’s definition 





 58. Id. at 1. 
59. Id.
 60. Id. at 5. 
61. Id.
 62. Id. at 2. 
63. Id.
 64. Id. at 4-5. 
65. Id. at 12. 
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of “refugee” and article 6’s “right to life” concept could be used in the
future to provide refugee protections to migrants displaced due to climate 
change and its effects.66 
IV. PATHWAY #1: EXPANDED INTERPRETATION OF “REFUGEE” 
As detailed previously, the 1951 Convention (as amended by the 1967 
Protocol) limited refugee status to individuals meeting four requirements: 
(1) the refugee must have fled his/her country; (2) the refugee must be unable
or unwilling to return home; (3) the refugee’s inability or unwillingness to 
return must be due to a fear of persecution; and (4) the persecution must 
be related to the refugee’s status in a particular group.67 Whereas, Teitiota
suggested a five-factor test for climate migrants to qualify for refugee 
protections under the 1951 Convention. Under Teitiota, to fall under the 
definition of “refugee,” the author must have been (1) involved in a land 
dispute or faced a real chance of being physically harmed in such a dispute 
in the future; (2) unable to find land to provide accommodation for himself 
(and family); (3) unable to grow food or to access potable water; (4) faced 
with life-threatening environmental conditions if returned; or (5) faced with  
a situation materially different than every other resident.68 The proposed
test in Teitiota does not require that individuals seeking refugee protections 
prove they would face imminent harm if returned. Instead, the Committee 
recognized that climate change-induced harm may occur both through “sudden 
onset” events, like extreme weather episodes, as well as “slow-onset” 
processes, like sea level rise.69 The latter may already be occurring but does 
not threaten imminent harm. 
Ultimately Ioane Teitiota failed to demonstrate that his situation met 
any of these five factors.70 While the Committee indicated that the “refugee” 
definition under the 1951 Convention could be read to include climate 
migrants, there are several remaining questions on its applicability. The 
“or” placed after the fourth factor indicates that each of the factors are 
individually sufficient for a successful claim, rather than all five being 
required. However, this decision was based on the facts presented by Teitiota, 
and there is no guarantee that these five factors are either extensively 
66. Id. at 10-12. 
67. DOCHERTY & GIANNINI, supra note 1, at 362; see also Amaratunga, supra note 
3, at 272–73. 
68. Teitiota, supra note 35, at 10. 
69. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Historic U.N. Human Rights 
Case Opens Door to Climate Change Asylum Claims (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www. ohchr.org/ 
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/
8HG4-YVVX].
70. Teitiota, supra note 35, at 10. 
50
ROSE_12 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021 9:15 AM     
  






















[VOL. 12:  41, 2021] The World After Teitiota
SAN DIEGO  JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
present or individually sufficient. Further, as the Committee found that
Teitiota did not fulfill any of the five factors, the precedential value of the 
decision is limited. Further litigation will be necessary to delineate the 
contours of each factor. 
Teitiota failed to show that he had been involved in a land dispute or
faced a real chance of suffering physical harm from violence; thus, it
remains unclear what degree of land disputes or violence would suffice to 
establish entitlement to relief. The Committee stated that: 
[The] general situation of violence is only of sufficient intensity to create a real
risk of irreparable harm under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant in the most extreme
cases, where there is a real risk of harm simply by virtue of an individual being
exposed to such violence on return, or where the individual in question is in a 
particularly vulnerable situation.71 
The Committee also noted a lack of a “situation of general conflict” in
the Republic of Kiribati.72 
Given the specificity inherent to the individualized assessment in Tetiota,
the precise contours of “most extreme” and “particularly vulnerable situation”
will be left to future cases. In addition to determining what level of violence
and vulnerability suffices, future cases will need to determine whether protection- 
seekers whose nation is experiencing general conflict due to climate change 
concerns, or where climate change is an element causally related to conflict, 
will sufficiently qualify an author for protections. 
The Committee stated that Teitiota’s testimony reflected that he was not 
alleging a specific risk of harm to himself, rather stating a general risk
experienced by all in Kiribati.73 This proposed dichotomy creates a great
deal of uncertainty when considered with the on-the-ground reality of 
climate change and catastrophe. Additional decisions will be necessary to 
reconcile the requirement to safeguard individuals from the violence 
caused by resource shortages. Indeed, if the idea that general, rather than 
individual, risk of harm is insufficient is carried to its extreme, then the 
complete collapse of a society due to climate change-induced conflicts 
would apply to all of its residents—yet that ubiquity could make none of 
the residents eligible to qualify as a refugee. 
71. Id. at 11. 
72. Id. See also Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 1540/2007, at 7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/94/D/1540/2007 (Nov. 19, 2008) (determining that even if the State party recognizes 
the “general human rights” of violence in Syria, the author must also show that the general 
violence is particularly applicable to the author). 
73. Teitiota, supra note 35, at 14. 
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The second factor—that the author is unable to find land to provide 
accommodation for himself and his family—was not individually analyzed
by the Committee; instead, the Committee deferred to the Tribunal’s
decision that Teitiota had not provided sufficient evidence that land was 
unavailable.74 Thus, the precise requirements for successfully making a
showing under this factor are unknown, and further litigation is necessary 
to establish workable limits and guidelines for making a showing regarding 
unavailability of land for a domicile. 
Teitiota also failed to provide sufficient evidence of the third factor: his 
inability to grow food or access potable water75 The Committee noted that
sixty percent of the population of South Tarawa obtained fresh water from 
the public utilities commission and stated that there was no evidence 
showing a lack of access to potable water.76 The Committee distinguished 
a “hardship” to access potable water from the inability to do so.77 However,
the dissent from Committee Member Vasilka Sancin stated that “potable 
water should not be equated with safe drinking water,” and argued that 
Teitiota established an inability to access fresh water.78 Future cases will 
need to parse this distinction between “hardship” and “inability,” while 
balancing the tensions of Committee members on the subject. In regard to 
the “inability to grow food” subset of this factor, the Committee found 
that, while it is difficult to grow crops due to the salt deposits in previously 
fertile land in South Tarawa, it was not impossible.79 The Committee also
noted that Teitiota failed to provide any information regarding alternative 
employment options or financial assistance from the state, suggesting that 
a future asylum-seeker will need to have exhausted all avenues of financial 
security before seeking refugee protections under this factor.80 Thus,
future litigation will need to determine whether this is a necessary subset 
of this factor and to what extent a state’s land must be unable to sustain 
crops in order to seek refugee protections.
The Committee alludes to article 6 when discussing the fourth factor: 
that the author must be facing life-threatening environmental conditions 
if returned. They stated that, “given the risk of an entire country becoming 
submerged under water is extreme, the conditions of life in such a country 
may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity.”81 In the case
of Teitiota, the Committee notes that the timeframe of ten to fifteen 
74. Id. at 5. 
75. Id. at 10. 
76. Id. at 11. 
77. Id.
 78. Id. at Annex I (internal quotations omitted).
79. Id. at 14. 
80. Id.
 81. Id. at 12. 
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years before “critical submersion” could allow for “intervening acts by
the Republic of Kiribati, with assistance from the international community.”82 
However, “could” is not the same as “capable of.” What could Kiribati, 
who has no control over rising sea levels, actually do to diminish the risk? 
The Committee was vague regarding what timeframe would be necessary
for a claim to succeed which leaves the international community wondering 
how long an individual would have to wait in a nation deteriorating from 
the effects of climate change before seeking protections. The message to
the international community, however, is clear: mitigate emissions to avoid 
these outcomes for individuals now, or risk undertaking the responsibilities
and obligations of the newly interpreted “refugee” status of climate
migrants.
Finally, the fifth factor, requiring the seeker to embody a situation materially 
different than every other resident, is not independently specified or even
discussed by the Committee. Rather, they note that there is an “absence 
of a situation of general conflict,” in Kiribati, seemingly disqualifying 
Teitiota from the individuality of risk requirement and instead deferring 
to the Tribunal’s ruling: Teitiota did not face a threat from climate change 
separate from the threat faced by all residents of Kiribati.83 This interpretation 
aligns with the 1951 Convention’s understanding of refugee as one fleeing 
persecution. Future litigation will need to tease out the degree of the 
individuality of risk the protection-seeker faces to succeed in a refugee 
protection claim. Researchers have previously presented an avenue in 
which individuals could qualify under the “persecution” requirement if 
their government knew about the vulnerability of a group to climate change 
effects but was unwilling to reduce those impacts.84 United States immigration 
law suggests that nations opposed to expanding refugee protections to climate 
migrants may similarly define “group” as rooted in inherent, immutable 
characteristics that pre-date persecution.85 Further criteria would need to
be evaluated by the Committee to determine the requirements of such 
a “group” and then would be subject to state parties’ own definitions. 
82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 4, 11. 
84. Toscano, supra note 10, at 481. 
85. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 27 I&N Dec. 
316, MATTER OF A-B-, RESPONDENT (A.G. 2018) (declaring that an applicant seeking to 
establish persecution on account of membership in a “particular social group” must 
demonstrate membership in a group, which is composed of members who share a common 
immutable characteristic). 
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The Committee’s decision in Teitiota creates an opening and an
incentive for the international community to act. Climate migrants will 
either be deemed “refugees” under the expanded interpretation, or they 
will need to seek assistance through other means.86 There is a strong 
incentive for countries to avoid the problem of climate migrants as 
refugees. Addressing the situation before catastrophe ensues will reduce 
states’ risks of incurring increased responsibilities, costs, and legal obligations 
that would arise with an expanded definition of refugee.87 
Relatedly, it is possible that polluting nations could be seen as causing
the circumstances for persecution and face steeper responsibilities and 
obligations.88 There are 146 parties to the 1951 Convention, nineteen of 
which are signatories (including France, Germany, and Israel).89 The 1967
Protocol has no signatories, but has 147 Parties, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation.90 However, the 1951 
Convention, as international law, is a law of consent. Accordingly, an adapted 
reading of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol is only effective if the 
states subject to the Convention and Protocol accept the interpretation. 
It would be naïve to suggest the international community would be able 
to avoid the climate migrant crisis, even if major progressive climate
action was implemented today. However, in suggesting that the 1951 
Convention definition could be read to include climate migrants, the 
Committee created a strong incentive for the international community to 
reduce the scale of this impending crisis. The emphasis the Committee 
placed on the Republic of Kiribati having a ten-to-fifteen-year timeline before 
critical submersion allows the international community to act quickly to 
avoid the mammoth crisis expected by 2050.91 Expanding the 1951 Convention
definition will not solve the crisis on its own. In dissent, Committee 
Member Duncan Laki Muhumuza underscored that the burden will still 
fall on the migrant to establish the risk and danger of being returned, 
and that in his opinion, this burden remains too high.92 In sum, expanding
86. Nishimura, supra note 18, at 115. 
87. Id.
 88. Benoit Mayer, The International Legal Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration: 
Proposal for an International Legal Framework, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
357, 382 (2011). 
89. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 2, Apr. 22 1954, 189 U.N.T.A.S. 
137, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V2&chapter=5& 
Temp=mtdsg2&clan g=_en [https://perma.cc/7QQZ- MA7A]. 
90. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 5, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=
5&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/8GC6-9224]. 
91. Teitiota, supra note 35, at 12. 
92. Id. at Annex 2, (Muhumuza, D., dissenting); see also Nishimura, supra note 18, 
at 115. 
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the definition of “refugee” set in the 1951 Convention is not a permanent 
or all-encompassing solution, but it offers a pathway to climate migrants 
within the existing legal framework.
V. PATHWAY #2: APPLYING ARTICLE 6 TO CLIMATE MIGRANTS
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
recognizes an inherent right to life that “shall be protected by law,” and 
that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life.”93 There are currently 173 
parties to the Covenant and seventy-four signatories, including the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.94 The Human Rights Committee 
has noted that the right to life “has been too often narrowly interpreted.”95 
The Committee stated in CCPR General Comment No. 6 that the “inherent
right to life cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and 
protection of this right requires nations adopt positive measures.”96 The
statement considered it “desirable for states parties to take all possible 
measures” to reduce infant mortality, increase life expectancy, and eliminate 
malnutrition and epidemics.97 “Desirable,” is not particularly binding 
language, but it serves as an informal push from the Committee to the 
international community to pursue such efforts to protect life before it 
becomes dire.
Teitiota presents the possibility of a future global precedent in which a 
state would be in breach of its human rights obligations if it returns
someone to a country where—due to climate change—the returnee’s life 
is at risk or in danger of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.98 The
Committee stated that “the obligation not to extradite, deport, or otherwise 
transport pursuant to article 6 may be broader than the scope of the principal 
93. U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, Executions: International Standards, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Executions/Pages/InternationalStandards.aspx-:~:text= 
Article 6 of the international, be arbitrarily deprived of life” [https://perma.cc/M64Z-82PQ]
(last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&
mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/8FWM-SVRX].
95. Memorandum from Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., CCPR General.
Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 5, Apr. 30, 1982. 
96. Id.
 97. Id.
 98. See generally Teitiota, supra at 35. 
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of non-refoulment99 under international refugee law, since it may also 
require the protection of aliens not entitled to refugee status.”100 This
Committee declaration suggests that there are responsibilities owed by 
both origin state parties and the international actors encountering refugee 
and asylum claims regardless of whether the individual qualifies for refugee 
status under the 1951 Convention. Such an interpretation opens another 
pathway for climate migrants to seek protections under the current framework. 
The Committee also noted that its previous general comment No. 36 
established that, “the right to life also includes the right of individuals to
enjoy a life with dignity and to be free from acts or omissions that would 
cause their unnatural or premature death.”101 General comment No. 36 
extended the obligations of parties to “respect and ensure [that] the right 
to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations” 
to “environmental degradation, climate change, and unsustainable 
development.”102 The Committee noted that these climate related risks are
“some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and 
future generations to enjoy the right to life.”103 Tying the risks of climate
change and its effects—even if they have not yet resulted in the loss of 
life—to article 6 protections, is a profoundly bold declaration by the 
Committee. This declaration binds the fate of nations’ response to climate 
change to their inherent duties to their residents and to those seeking 
refugee status.104 
Teitiota suggested a three factor test that may be used to determine if a 
state has violated its obligations under article 6: (1) an act or omission by 
government that indicates a risk that the individual would be deprived of 
life; (2) sufficient degree of risk at the relevant time; and (3) a situation 
materially different from that of every other citizen.105 In Teitiota’s case, 
the Committee found insufficient evidence that “the Government of 
Kiribati had failed to take programmatic steps to provide for the basic 
needs of life in order to meet its positive obligation to fulfill the author’s 
right to life.”106 The Committee noted that the five factors of the “refugee”
99. Id. at 9 (explaining non-refoulement is the practice of not forcing refugees or
asylum seekers to return to a country in which they are liable to be subjected to 
persecution).
100. Id. at 9–10. 
101. Id. (explaining this definition has yet to be used on a wide scale on issues like 
abject poverty, which arguably is a failure on the behalf of a State to provide the right to 
life. This reality complicates the extension of the No. 36 protection to climate migrants). 
102. Id. at 10. 
103. Id.
 104. Id.
 105. Id. at 10–11. 
106. Id. at 10. 
56
ROSE_12 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021 9:15 AM     
  










[VOL. 12:  41, 2021] The World After Teitiota
SAN DIEGO  JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
definition expansion discussed above were not sufficiently proved by 
Teitiota—he had not sufficiently demonstrated a sufficient degree of risk 
at the relevant time.107 The Committee underscored the ten to fifteen year 
timeline and the positive actions taken by the Government of Kiribati to 
address climate change and its effects.108 
While Teitiota’s case failed to meet the three factors required for article 
6 protections, the Committee did not insist that “pacific islands [need] to 
be under water before triggering human rights obligations to protect the 
right to life.”109 Future litigation is necessary, as with the 1951 Convention 
definition of “refugee,” to determine the extent and limits of a sufficient 
governmental response as well as the level of risk and imminence of risk. 
As in the expansion of the “refugee” definition, the Committee’s comments 
on article 6 protections hinged on the notion of individual or unique risk—
the author’s situation must be materially different than every other citizen. 
Thus, there is some meaningful interplay between the five-factor test under 
the expanded refugee definition and the three-factor test for relief under 
article 6. A thorough analysis of this relationship will require additional 
cases and rulings. 
As the two inquiries are rhetorically connected, the questions left open 
by this aspect of the Committee’s decisions are similar to those discussed
above regarding refugee status. Specifically, the question remains as to: 
(1) what sort of characteristics would suffice to qualify a group to meet
these standards, and (2) to what extent does one need to face unique
circumstances in a crisis that, by definition, will affect whole States? 
As noted throughout, Teitiota merely created a framework from which to 
begin to examine these pressing issues. Parsing the specific elements will 
require additional cases that allow the Committee to apply its proposed 
inquiries to different fact patterns. But commentary by the Committee on 
article 6 reinforces the possibility that doing so will promote climate change 
action by state parties and the international community. As the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights stated shortly after Teitiota, 
“without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate 
107. Id. at 12. 
108. Id.
 109. UN landmark case for people displaced by climate change, AMNESTY INT’L, 
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change in origin nations may trigger the non-refoulment obligations of 
receiving states”110 Triggering non-refoulment would incentivize all parties
to address the now unavoidable climate migrant crisis. 
VI. HYPOTHETICAL
Teitota’s claims failed across all five factors of the expanded reading of
“refugee” and all three factors of the extension of article 6, but the HRC’s 
decision does definitively open the possibility that a varying fact pattern 
could lead to a climate migrant being granted refugee protections. I propose 
a fact pattern111 that could be successful in the eyes of the Committee, 
based on the inferences they left dispersed throughout Teitiota: 
1.1 The author of the communication is Pipsqueak Bear, a 
national of Thneed-Ville. His application for refugee status 
in Whoville was rejected. He claims that the State party 
violated his article 6 right to life under the Covenant and the 
1951 Convention by removing him to Thneed-Ville. The 
author is represented by Counsel, the Lorax. 
1.2 The author claims that the effects of climate change and
deforestation by both the State of Thneed-Ville and other 
developed states forced him to migrate from Thneed-Ville 
to Whoville. The situation in Thneed-Ville has become 
increasingly unstable and precarious due to deforestation, 
pollution, and loss of habitable land. 
1.3 Fresh water has become scarce due to the high levels of
pollution and habitat is largely inhabitable due to deforestation 
and subsequent erosion. Attempts to mitigate erosion and its 
consequences have proven ineffective. 
1.4 Inhabitable land has resulted in a housing crisis and wide-
spread land disputes leading to multiple fatalities. The author 
himself suffered non-life-threatening injuries when he was 
thrown off his land repeatedly by newcomers, Brett and Chet. 
Thneed-Ville has thus become an untenable and violent
environment for the author and his family.
1.5 The government of Thneed-Ville has attempted to provide
subsidized “clean air” and water supplied by O’Hare Air, 
which is owned and operated by the Mayor. However, the 
110.  UN Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, supra note 69. 
111.  The general framework of this hypothetical is based on Dr. Seuss’s The Lorax, 
however creative liberties have been taken to create a fact pattern fitting of the questions 
presented in Teitiota. 
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government has also actively continued efforts that are 
accelerating pollution and deforestation in Thneed-Ville. 
To review, in analyzing Pipsqueak Bear’s case, the Committee will 
(likely) look to the 1951 Convention and article 6. Pipsqueak meets the
first two requirements under the wording of the 1951 convention: (1) he 
has fled his home country and (2) is unable/unwilling to return home. In
analyzing the third and fourth requirements: (3) the inability/unwillingness to
return being due to persecution and (4) that persecution being related to 
status in a particular group, the Committee will look towards the five-
factor test discussed earlier in this analysis: (a) Pipsqueak has been
involved in a land dispute, (b) the deforestation and subsequent pollution
has led to Pipsqueak and his family being unable to find suitable land for
accommodation, (c) the pollution has led to a lack of access to clean drinking 
water, (d) Pipsqueak fears for his family’s safety both from natural conditions
and the violence stemming from lack of resources and considers Thneed-
Ville to provide life-threatening conditions, and finally (e) Pipsqueak argues 
that his condition is unique in that he has personally faced violence and
the effects of resource scarcity in Thneed-Ville. 
The Committee will likely accept that Pipsqueak fulfills the requirements
of (a) and (b), he has endured violence in direct result of a land dispute
and is now unable to find housing for himself and his family. Thneed-
Ville has seen a rapid expansion of deforestation efforts and a recent report 
suggests that there is only one tree left standing. As for (c), the Committee 
may rule that there are still potable water sources available in Thneed-
Ville, especially since the government has provided some water to its 
citizens. However, if the Committee adopts the view of Member Vasilka 
Sancin, the lack of accessible drinking water would be sufficient to fulfill 
this requirement. It is likely the Committee would also accept (d), the 
Committee stated in Teitiota that life-threatening conditions would suffice 
even if such situations do not result in the loss of life.112 Here, the author 
states that there has been loss of life from land disputes and that he himself 
has suffered injury. Finally, the most difficult hurdle to Pipsqueak’s claim, 
(e) the requirement that an author’s situation must be materially different 
than other residents. Solely drawing from the Teitiota decision, it is 
unlikely Pipsqueak would prevail on this factor alone because all 
individuals in Thneed-Ville are suffering the same effects of climate 
112. Teitiota, supra note 35, at 10. 
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change and witnessing a loss of habitable land, drinkable water, and the
presence of wide-spread violence. It is unlikely the Committee will see 
Pipsqueak’s situation as unique. However, Member Duncan Laki Muhmuza 
stated in his dissent his belief that the “threshold should not be too 
high and unreasonable,” and that the Committee must “consider all relevant 
facts and conditions, which comprise among other conditions, the grave 
situation in the author’s country.”113 Pipsqueak could draw upon this dissent 
to urge the Committee to specify its requirement under factor (e). 
As Teitiota is understood to this point, any of the five factors may be 
sufficient to allow Pipsqueak refugee protections under the 1951 Convention.
The urgency of the situation in Thneed-Ville would likely compel the 
Committee to grant Pipsqueak protections. It will still be necessary for the 
Committee to grapple with the fifth factor, the “materially different” 
requirement as it stands in theoretical conflict with the threat of climate
change and its effects. 
Pipsqueak’s case under an article 6 argument is even more clear. Teitiota
suggested that protections could be extended to climate migrants if there 
is (a) and act or omission by the government that indicates risk of being 
deprived of life, (b) sufficient degree of risk at the relevant time, and (c) a 
materially different situation than every other citizen. Here, the government
of Thneed-Ville has failed to sufficiently provide its citizens with mitigation 
supplies (at least without also profiting from such supplies) and have continued 
efforts to worsen the climate change effects in Thneed-Ville. Further, as 
the author has presented, there is one remaining tree left in Thneed-Ville 
and violence over resource scarcity has already broken out and resulted in
death. Finally, the Committee will again have to grapple with the “materially 
different” element, and if read like Teitiota, may deny Pipsqueak protections. 
Overall, Pipsqueak would likely be extended refugee protections by the 
Committee. There is a clear and imminent threat in Thneed-Ville and
Pipsqueak has met the majority of all requirements discussed in Teitiota. 
However, this ruling will be in conflict with the “materially different”
aspect of both the 1951 Convention and article 6 reading. Additionally, it
will be up to Whoville to accept the new reading provided by Teitota
and this ruling by the Committee to comply and extend such protections 
to Pipsqueak and his family.
VII. CONCLUSION
Teitiota offers two possible pathways in which climate migrants could 
seek refugee protections under existing legal frameworks. However, the 
reality is that the international community and its existing institutions are 
113. Id. at 15.
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insufficiently addressing the problem.114 The UNHCR has not instituted 
protections for environmental refugees and has not “viewed its mandate 
as including such protections.”115 The intersection between climate migration 
with socioeconomic status means that confronting climate migration must 
be addressed through both policy and law.116 There are unresolved tensions
between the majority and the dissenters in the Teitiota case regarding how 
drastic conditions must be, which conditions must exist, and how unique 
those conditions must be to the seeker in order to qualify for protections. 
These remaining questions need to be addressed in future litigation before 
a new path to protections can be relied on by climate migrants. Presently, 
whether or not to accept these new interpretations rests on the shoulders 
of political actors in their respective nations. Ultimately, Teitiota offers a 
landmark framework for tying the fate of climate migrants and climate change 
to positive obligations of state parties and the international community.117 Such 
a milestone—while not comprehensive and riddled with tensions—should 
not be overlooked. Teitiota has pioneered potential legal pathways toward 
international solutions to the mammoth and complex crisis of climate 
migrants. 
114. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 1, at 359. 
115. Id.
 116. Id. at 360; Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: 
Implications for International Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 607, 607 (2009). 
117. Nishimura, supra note 18, at 119. 
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